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Résumé: Ce papier analyse les motivations à l'achat de l'assurance dépendance, à partir 
d'une analyse statistique de données d'assurance et de l'utilisation d'un modèle 
de cycle de vie. Nous faisons un bref survol des arguments en faveur et en 
défaveur de l'achat d'assurance dépendance. Ensuite des lois d'occurrence de 
dépendance irréversible et de durée de vie dans cet état sont estimées sur un 
portefeuille de contrats d'assurance d'une mutuelle espagnole. Des effets 
calendaires sont estimés, conjointement avec les effets de l'âge et du genre. Ces 
résultats statistiques sont ensuite inclus dans un modèle de cycle de vie dépargne 
et d'achat d'assurance. Une application numérique de ce modèle est proposée, qui 
conduit à un âge d'achat de quarante ans. 
 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the rationale of long-term care insurance purchasing, from a 
statistical analysis of insurance data and a life cycle model. We make a short 
survey of the pros and cons of LTC insurance purchase. Then risk distributions in 
the occurrence and duration dimension are estimated on a Spanish portfolio. 
Calendar effects are estimated besides age and gender. These statistical results 
are integrated in a life cycle model of savings and insurance purchasing. A 
numerical illustration is also provided, which leads to an optimal age of forty 
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1 Introduction
The continuous ageing of the population in developed countries creates a need for
long-term care services. These services provide assistance to individuals subject to
old-age dependency. They are often termed community care and are a substitute
to the care-giving traditionally provided by the family and neighbours of the
dependent individual. In southern European countries, the role of community
care is still incipient as compared to Northern Europe. A 2005 survey shows
that Spanish families provide care for 69 percent of the non-institutionalized
population.1 In the United Kingdom, the corresponding percentage is equal to
32. This disparity can be explained by a wider spread of community care in
the UK. However in Spain, the number of older people that live alone or with
a partial informal support system (either due to the death of a spouse or to a
limited number of children) is increasing. Therefore, the risk that they will need
assistance or residential services is escalating.
In 2006, the Spanish government instituted a law to promote personal au-
tonomy and care to persons in a situation of dependency (Ley de Promoción de
la Autonomía Personal y Atención a las Personas en Situación de Dependencia).
This law was designed to function as the “fourth pillar” of the welfare system
at all coverage levels, but during 2007, only those having the highest degree of
severity received public subsidies. The system is financed by public funding at
the state, regional and local level. It is not based on a compulsory contribution
as in Germany, and the benefits are first provided on the basis of a severity score.
In the case of the highest severity of impairment, eligibility is based only on that
severity score. If the level of severity is lower, eligibility is determined also on
the basis of income and wealth. Due to the high costs of LTC, it became obvi-
ous shortly after the system had been implemented that the overall cost of the
coverage was much higher than predicted by the law. One can argue that due to
a strong marketing campaign by the Government, most individuals initially be-
lieved that the public system would cover all LTC needs, but the Spanish public
system is designed as a social right in very acute situations.
In this context, most insurers claim to be prepared to launch LTC products
for the Spanish market, but actually only a few of them really oﬀer this type
of insurance. The reason put forward is the lack of demand. As a consequence,
insurers have insisted that LTC products must be tax qualified in order to be at-
tractive to consumers. The recently approved tax regulation permits a deduction
of the premiums paid to LTC insurance for severe and total dependence (up to
€12500 per year) from income for fiscal purposes. Unfortunately, at this point,
most individuals are confused by the changing regulations and do not know ex-
1Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta (2006).
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actly what their legal rights are with respect to public LTC coverage and what
private insurance can really oﬀer.
There are two polar insurance markets for private LTC insurance. The
French market provides fixed indemnity coverage in the form of monthly annuity
payments. On the contrary, the American market operates on the basis of reim-
bursement models. The American model is subject to escalating costs, especially
through court decisions and a moral hazard eﬀect.2 However a reimbursement
insurance contract provides a better hedging of risks. The Spanish market is
developing along the lines similar to those retained in France. We will implicitly
refer to this type of insurance product in risk assessment and in the economic
analysis of insurance demand. Hence the components of LTC risk assessed in the
paper are the occurrence and the duration of the LTC spell, but not the severity
of impairment and its financial consequences. We summarize the pros and cons
of LTC insurance purchase in the next section. Then we present a statistical
analysis of a Spanish portfolio of permanent disability insurance contracts sold
by a mutual insurance company. They include long-term care for the elderly,
and we describe both the occurrence risk of an irreversible disability state, and
the duration in this state. Our statistical study includes an analysis of calendar
eﬀects. In the Section “Life cycle analysis of ex ante LTC insurance demand,”
we integrate our statistical results into an economic model of optimal insurance
purchasing in order to question the timing of LTC insurance purchase during a
lifetime. We use an extension of Yaari’s life cycle model,3 with the addition of
an irreversible disability state. We present a numerical illustration of the model
in which the optimal age of purchase is about forty years. We also perform a
sensitivity analysis of the consumer’s behaviour with respect to the main para-
meters of the life cycle model. We discuss the limits of our approach (selection
bias issues as insurance demand is assessed from a portfolio of policies, connec-
tions with usual insurance demand models). Lastly, we draw conclusions and we
clarify our future research directions. Technicalities are relegated to an appendix
available at the URL
http://ceco.polytechnique.fr/publications/ (working paper 2008-03).
2 The pros and cons of long-term care insurance
purchase
Let us detail the arguments in favour of LTC insurance purchase. Some of them
are derived from a risk analysis of LTC. There are two components in LTC risk.
2See Kessler (2008) for more developments.
3Yaari (1965).
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The first component is the occurrence risk of facing an LTC spell during the life
cycle, and the second is the duration risk in the LTC state (together with the
severity of impairment). A decrease in the occurrence probability of an LTC
spell should be followed by a similar variation of the price of LTC insurance,
and make insurance purchase less deterred by potential losses due to lapses. In-
deed, an LTC contract is a very illiquid asset, which is usually not or partially
repaid in case of surrender. The probability of using the coverage on the life cycle
strongly depends on the contract type. A fixed indemnity coverage only insures
irreversible LTC spells, as the policyholder receives an annuity. The probability
of facing an LTC spell during the life cycle is close to ten percent on our data
for the representative consumer retained in our life cycle analysis (a man, born
in 1950). When insurance contracts follow a reimbursement model, they usu-
ally cover reversible dependence risk and the aforementioned probability often
exceeds twenty five percent. Because of risk aversion, the willingness to buy LTC
coverage increases with the expected duration of LTC and with the heterogeneity
of duration distributions. Besides, an overestimation of risks is often observed
for low frequencies and increases the motivation to insure.4 Individuals who en-
gage in more preventive health activity tend to systematically overestimate the
probability of a dependence spell.5 In this respect, long-term care risk could be a
source of "advantageous selection", at least for young buyers of insurance. This
means that insurance purchase might send a positive signal on the risk level, a
result opposite to the usual "adverse selection" eﬀect.6 Lastly, the motivation to
buy LTC coverage increases with bequest motives.
The first argument against the purchase of LTC insurance is the crowding
out eﬀect by public insurance. In Germany, for instance, a fifth pillar of the
social security system was created in 1995 and it leaves little room for private
insurance.7 A high loading factor for LTC insurance may also deter potential
buyers. An statistical study of American contracts quotes an average value of
0.18 if the policy is held until death, whereas the loading factor raises to 0.51 if
we account for lapses.8 The presence of children can work in two ways. On one
hand, it creates bequest motives and a motivation to buy insurance coverage. On
the other hand, the elderly may fear that, if they purchase insurance, children
may institutionalize them when they are unable to act on their own. Therefore,
4Kunreuther et al. (1978).
5Finkelstein and McGarry (2006).
6See De Meza and Webb (2001) for an economic analysis of "advantageous selection", and
Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) for econometric developments on adverse vs. advantageous
selection on the Medigap insurance market in the USA.
7See Taleyson (2003) for a survey of the LTC insurance market along with public financing
of long-term care in the world.
8Brown and Finkelstein (2007).
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an elderly person who prefers attention from children over purchased help may
decide not to buy long-term care insurance.9 Another reason not to buy LTC
insurance is the lower utility of consumption in a poor health state.10
Other problems arise besides the insurance purchasing choice. The first
is the optimal date of purchasing. Indeed, there is an irreversibility issue: the
insurance contract often cannot be repaid before entry into the LTC state. Hence,
there is a timing decision which must be made as in any real options issue.
Second, there is an alternative solution to ex ante insurance, which consists in
buying annuities once the LTC state is reached. Several products of this type are
proposed, which are termed immediate annuities, reverse mortgages, etc. The
wealth eﬀect on the willingness to buy LTC insurance is not straightforward. On
one hand, the deterrence eﬀect of repayment risk should decrease with income and
wealth. Besides, bequest motives increase with wealth and motivate the hedging
of LTC risk. On the other hand, the motivation to use immediate annuities as
a substitute for ex ante insurance (i.e., to self-insure against occurrence risk)
increases with wealth. For instance, home equity can be sold in return for a life
annuity, should an LTC spell occur.11
3 Statistical analysis of a Spanish data base
3.1 Presentation of the data base
In Spain some insurers have sold LTC coverage for many years as an extension to
permanent disability insurance. Individuals who claim not to be able to perform
daily life activities receive an annuity, even if they already retired. The data
analyzed here comes from a sample of contracts drawn at random from a mutual
insurance company. We have 150000 insurance contracts and 2800 LTC spells
in round figures. The information was collected for thirty years, which allows us
to study calendar eﬀects from 1975 to 2005. The file contains all the available
data for policyholders having underwritten the same product. The product is
a disability coverage that provides a monthly compensation when a person is
declared disabled. The state of disability is assessed by doctors appointed by
the company on the basis of standard medical and physical tests. Disability
is equivalent to a severe dependence level, where the individual is not able to
perform daily life activities without the assistance of another person. Conditions
to become eligible are very strict. In the contract they are defined as "a permanent
9See Sloan and Norton (1997) for further developments and an empirical study on the
AHEAD and HRS data bases.
10Pauly (1990).
11Davidoﬀ (2008).
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and irreversible loss of the capacity to function autonomously due to: irreversible
psychotic disorder, hemiplegia, paraplegia, severe Parkinson disorder, aphasia or
Wernicke disorder, or dementia due to cerebral malfunction". In addition, due to
the traditional practice in the company, blindness or losing two arms or legs are
suﬃcient conditions to grant compensation.
The insurance product analyzed here can be understood as an LTC insur-
ance which complements a permanent disability coverage. It was very popular
in the 60s and 70s, mainly due to the disability coverage and to the weakness of
public pensions at that time. A striking result is the age of policyholders at the
inception of the insurance contract, which is only 28 years, and it increases with
calendar time. An explanation is that the policyholders first hedged permanent
disability risk, in a context where the public coverage was very weak. Usually
buyers of LTC insurance are middle aged or are young retirees. In France, the
age of LTC insurance purchasers decreased from 65 to 61 years on average in a
few years. The application of a life cycle approach given later in the paper shows
however that rather young adults may rationally opt for LTC coverage.
3.2 Statistical results
3.2.1 Duration distributions of LTC spells
Table 1 presents the estimation of a proportional hazards model on the duration
of LTC spells. Covariates are the age at the beginning of the LTC spell, the
corresponding date in order to allow for a calendar eﬀect, and the gender. The
individuals are the LTC spells, and the dependent variable is the pair duration -
event indicator. The event is death (1868 deaths out of 2787 LTC spells), which
is the only possible exit from LTC in our setting. Dependent policyholders who
are still alive at the date of data gathering generate a censored observation.
Table 1: Proportional hazards model for the duration of LTC
Covariates Estimated Estimated
coeﬃcient standard deviation
x1 : Age at the beginning of the LTC spell 0.0558 0.00248
x2 : Date at the beginning of the LTC spell 0.0788 0.00499
x3 : Indicator of female gender -0.325 0.166
The proportional hazards model estimates a death rate for individuals in LTC,
where the specification of the instantaneous death rate of the policyholder i is
λi(t) = exp(α1 (x1)i + α2 (x2)i + α3 (x3)i)× h(t).
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The duration t is the seniority of the policyholder in the LTC state.
Ceteris paribus, a supplementary year of age increases the mortality rate of
5.7%, and a supplementary calendar year is associated to an 8.2% increase.12 This
second result denotes a decreasing trend in the duration of LTC. Women also stay
longer than men in LTC. The estimated instantaneous death rate for the average
characteristics (x1 = 70.8 years; x2 = 1997.4; x3 = 5.4%) is roughly equal to
0.13, with a slightly increasing shape as a function of seniority. This means that
the death rate per year in this case is close to 0.12. This death rate is the average
for 84-year-old men in Spain in 1997, and for 88-year-old women, regardless of
their health state. Entering in an LTC state strongly increases mortality for the
elderly, but the relative variation decreases with age and with the seniority in
LTC.
3.2.2 Occurrence risk of entry in an LTC spell
The purpose of this section is to analyze the occurrence rate of entry in an LTC
spell, depending on the age and calendar time. We did not introduce gender
because women represent only five percent of LTC spells and their sample is too
small for a regression-based estimation. The relative risk exposure associated
to women is equal to twenty percent if measured by the duration, and to seven
percent if the age and calendar time are controlled for with the model estimated
hereafter. About 150000 policies are considered in the analysis, but there are
almost 60000 lapses in the sample. The portfolio reached a peak of 90000 policies
in 1992, then it was closed because LTC and permanent disability insurance
contracts were redefined for new business. There were 55000 policies remaining
in 2005.
The number of entries in LTC for a given age and calendar year is compared
to the risk exposure. As we have many zeroes for these numbers but also for risk
exposure, we did not perform a direct analysis of the entry rates, as in a Lee-
Carter approach. We retained a binomial model and a specification of the hazard
rate which is that of Lee-Carter. Let net,x be the number of entries in LTC
during the year t at the age x, where t and x have integer values. If nght,x is the
corresponding number of policyholders in good health (i.e. the risk exposure),
the binomial model is the following
NEt,x ∼ B(nght,x, pt,x); pt,x = 1− exp(−λt,x); λt,x = exp(ax + ctux). (1)
The vectors a, c and u represent respectively an average age eﬀect, a calendar
eﬀect and a multiplier applied to the calendar eﬀect. For instance, consider two
12This calendar eﬀect is too high to be used for plausible long run predictions. Taking into
account sub-intervals of calendar time in the estimation leads to rather chaotic results.
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diﬀerent calendar dates t1 and t2, and a given age x. The ratio between the
corresponding hazard rates is equal to
λt2,x
λt1,x
= exp((ct2 − ct1)× ux).
The last expression leads to an interpretation of u as a multiplier on calendar
eﬀects.13
Identifying constraints are required for c and u. In a Lee-Carter approach,
the principal components c are centered and the norm of the principal factor u
is equal to one. We retained these constraints here, with weights proportional to
the number of entries.14 The model needs strictly positive margins on the number
of entries in order to be estimated. We restricted the calendar time interval from
year 1975 to 2005, and age from 30 to 95 years. The first seven calendar years
are gathered in a single observation, due to low values for the number of entries
in LTC spells at the beginning. The age levels are three year intervals. Hence
we have 25 calendar levels and 22 age levels in the estimation. The estimation of
the average eﬀect a is given in Figure 1. The growth rate with respect to age of
the entry rate into LTC is almost constant and close to ten percent. This result
is close to what is usually observed for death rates (growth equal to 8-9 percent
per year for most of the life cycle). The ratio between the entry rate into LTC
and the death rate is close to 0.1 for the consumer retained in Section 4 (a man,
born in 1950), and the same result holds for the probability of facing an LTC
spell before dying.
The average entry rate into LTC increases quickly with calendar time in
the portfolio, but this growth partly disappears if age is controlled for, as in
this model. Figure 2 exhibits almost constant values for ct during the last ten
years. The coherence with the preceding result is due to the constant ageing of
policyholders in the portfolio. There is however a sharp increase in the entry
rate in 1992 and 1993. The insurance company modified its rating structure
at that time, and this calendar eﬀect could reflect a simultaneous slackening of
acceptance rules for LTC spells.
The multiplier u increases beyond sixty years of age (see Figure 3). The
increase of the entry rates in LTC observed before 1995 in Figure 2 is only eﬀective
beyond sixty years.
13The Lee-Carter (1992) model performs a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the log-
arithms of entry rates, which are most often death rates. The vectors a, c and u are respectively
the averages of log-rates by age, the principal components and the principal factors of the PCA.
14This choice was made from a local expansion of the log-likelihood of the binomial model,
interpreted as an euclidean distance between theoretical and empirical frequencies. Anyway,
the estimated hazard function does not depend on the identifying constraints.
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4 Life cycle analysis of ex ante LTC insurance
demand
A life cycle analysis of the consumer is the suitable framework to analyze the
timing of LTC insurance purchase. In this section, we present an extension of
Yaari’s model. Yaari’s paper is seminal for the life cycle analysis of consumption
and savings with life duration risk. It complements the fixed horizon models,
where randomness is considered at the income and asset return levels.15 The ra-
tionale for LTC insurance purchase can also be studied in the Merton-Samuelson
framework. Gupta and Li16 follow this approach (the planning horizon is retire-
ment), with a stochastic model on the health capital and also departures from
the expected utility model. Our model starts from Yaari’s specification (see the
appendix for a summary), and includes LTC insurance bought ex ante in a model
where irreversible dependency is a possible transition between a good health state
and death. Adverse selection is low for young buyers of LTC insurance (for which
we might even have an "advantageous selection" eﬀect), as discussed in Section 2.
Our approach, which applies on LTC insurance demand statistical results which
are derived from LTC policies should not create an important selection bias. Us-
ing the statistical estimations of the preceding section, we will give a numerical
example of optimal insurance purchase and savings behaviour in this context.
Figure 4 shows the life cycle evolution of a consumer’s optimal consumption
and wealth under the following assumptions.
• The income flow is also given in Figure 4. It increases from 25 to 50 years,
then decreases until the age of retirement (65 years). The retirement income
is constant and equal to sixty percent of the maximum wage. The wealth
at age 25 is equal to zero.
• The utility of consumption u is a CRRA function. The relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient is equal to 2, and we retained u(c) = −1/c. The CRRA utility
function is retained first because the marginal propensity to consume is in-
finite in zero, which rules out a null consumption at the optimum. In that
case, the life cycle model is restricted to the time interval where income is
strictly positive. This result simplifies the interpretation of the Euler equa-
tion on the optimal consumption path. The Euler equation is fulfilled when
positivity constraints on wealth and consumption are not binding. With
a CRRA function, this means that wealth is greater than zero. Economic
15Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969).
16Gupta and Li (2007).
11
studies state that a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient should range between
1 and 4 for most of the consumers.17
• The utility of bequests (depending on the date of death and on the wealth
bequeathed) is obtained from a hump-shaped function of time and from
an increasing and concave function of wealth. A plausible optimal wealth
path implies that the marginal utility of consumption exceeds the marginal
utility of bequests if the wealth is large enough (see Section A.1).
• The real interest rate is equal to 2%, and the subjective discount rate is
equal to 3%.
• Lastly, the mortality rates are estimated and predicted from Spanish data
at the national level. We estimated a Lee-Carter model on mortality rates
drawn from the Human Mortality Database (available at the URL
http://www.mortality.org/). Mortality rates for individuals in good
health are then estimated for each gender in order to make the national
mortality rates consistent with our statistical results on LTC. The consumer
is assumed to be a man, born in 1950.
From Figure 4, we see that the consumer begins to save at age 41. The
wealth reaches a peak at the age of retirement, and then decreases until age 84.
The downturn of wealth at the age of retirement is due to the continuity of the
optimal consumption path. Hence the decrease in savings compensates the drop
in income at that date. At the end of the life cycle, there is no bequest left to
the heirs. The last result is unavoidable in the Yaari’s model under fairly general
conditions (see Appendix A.1).18
Usual LTC insurance is bought ex ante, i.e. when the policyholder is in
good health. The policy covers both an occurrence and a duration risk. Other
LTC insurance products are immediate annuities which are bought when the
policyholder has reached the LTC state. In that case only the duration risk is
covered.
Let us include ex ante LTC insurance in this life cycle model. We suppose
that the coverage can be bought only once in a lifetime, and that the insurance
contract cannot be repaid. Three states of health are defined (good health, irre-
versible dependency, death). The purchase occurs only in the good health state,
and the premium is paid continuously until this state is left. If the policyholder
dies at this date, there is nothing left in the bequest from the insurance company.
If the policyholder enters the LTC state, he then receives an annuity.
17Barsky et al (1997), Gollier (2001).
18The original proof is due to Leung (1994).
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The theoretical properties of this model are given in the appendix, when
the utility of consumption is the same in the LTC state as in good health. The
Euler equation on consumption is not modified by the addition of LTC risk and
insurance in Yaari’s model if the utility function in the LTC state is the same as
in good health. However this equation holds only when the positivity constraint
on wealth is not binding. As the income equations are diﬀerent in the two models,
the link between consumption and savings is also diﬀerent. Lastly, the optimal
timing of LTC insurance purchase is given by a "smooth pasting" condition on
the residual expected utility of consumption and bequests. This means that a
rational consumer should buy the insurance coverage at a date when the marginal
value of waiting to purchase is equal to the marginal time value after the insurance
purchase.
As an example, let us apply our life cycle model with a cost of LTC free of
public benefits which is equal to two thirds of the retirement income. We also
assume that the insurance policy completely covers this loss, and that the utility
of consumption is the same in the LTC state as in good health. The occurrence
and duration risks of LTC are derived from the statistical analysis of the preceding
section. We suppose that the insurance policy is priced based on the expected
loss, with the interest rate used for the consumer’s utility, and with a loading
factor equal to thirty percent. We also included a three year qualifying period
(i.e. the policyholder is insured if the LTC spell begins at least three years after
the inception of the contract). With these assumptions, LTC insurance coverage
is bought at 39 years, with a premium level equal to 0.6 percent of the maximum
income. The saving behaviour is close to what is observed without insurance,
with the same ages for the wealth accumulation and decumulation cycle.
We now perform a sensitivity analysis of the consumer’s behaviour with
respect to the main parameters. These parameters are the subjective discount
rate a, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ηu(c) = −u
0
(c)/c u00(c) (inverse
of the relative risk aversion for a separable lifetime utility, hence a constant for a
CRRA utility function), the real interest rate r, the income flow and the coverage
level cl of LTC risk. Parameters are modified one by one, and the main results
(interval where savings are positive, maximum wealth, age at insurance purchase)
are given for each scenario.
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Table 2: Sensitivity analysis of the consumer’s behaviour with respect
to the main parameters: a = 3% ; ηu = 1/2 ; r = 2% ; cl = 100%
Departure(s) from Beginning of the End of the Maximum Age at
the basic scenario saving period saving period wealth purchase
None 41 84 2.52 39
a = 4% 45 81 1.65 42
ηu = 1/3 40 87 2.79 37
r = 3% 38 91 3.86 36
other income flow 47 85 2.39 44
cl = 50% 41 84 2.60 37
Let us briefly comment these results. The maximum wealth is always reached at
retirement, due to the drop in income at that date. The saving and insurance
purchase decision are deferred if the subjective discount rate increases from 3 to
4%, which is not surprising because preference for present increases then. The
saving level strongly decreases, and the Yaari’s model cannot match real-world
behavior for large values of the subjective discount rate. If relative risk aversion
increases from 2 to 3 (hence ηu decreases from 1/2 to 1/3), the saving period is
wider and the purchase date decreases. The optimal consumption flow must be
flatter since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution decreases, which explains
the modification of the saving period. An increase in the real interest rate entails
a modification of the output at the opposite of that observed after an increase
in the subjective discount rate. In the latter case, the savings modification is
similar whereas in the former case the increase in wealth is partly due to the
modification of the rate of return on assets. The alternative income flow increases
until retirement. The saving decision is delayed because highest income levels are
reached later in the life cycle. Lastly, a partial insurance coverage does not modify
the saving period, but increases slightly the saving level. Savings can be seen here
as a substitute for insurance. Insurance purchase always precedes the beginning of
the saving cycle in our examples, and the lag ranges between two and four years.
Interpreting this result is not easy because the "smooth pasting" condition which
determines the optimal purchase date is based on time derivatives of the residual
lifetime utility. The meaning of those items is not easy to grasp.
Let us compare this life cycle approach with usual models of insurance de-
mand. In our model, self-insurance means that the purchase decision is postponed
until the end of the life cycle. A pending question is whether self-insurance with
respect to LTC occurrence risk together with a saving cycle (very frequent in the
real-world) could be derived from this life cycle model. This might not be true,
but assumptions of the Yaari’s model favour an early purchase of LTC insurance.
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For instance, the income flow and the asset return are deterministic in Yaari’s
model and so is the optimal wealth path. In a risky environment, the consumer
would value information on his wealth perspectives and postpone the purchase
decision.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented the motivations for LTC insurance purchase. Occurrence
and duration risks were estimated on a Spanish portfolio of permanent disability
insurance contracts, and we also used national statistics for death rates. Then
we presented an economic model of optimal insurance purchasing in order to
question the timing of LTC insurance purchase during a lifetime. The life cycle
model deals with the transition and duration risks associated to the health states.
We restricted the interpretation to a numerical application of the model and to
a sensitivity analysis, but we plan to develop later an analysis of the purchase
date as a function of the various parameters. We also intend to include ex post
LTC insurance in the model. The purpose is to assess to what extent it could be
a substitute to the classical insurance.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Yaari’s model
The model maximizes a lifetime utility under life duration risk, with a bequest
motive. Only duration risk is dealt with, and the income flow m is deterministic.
The time index is equal to zero at the consumer’s birth, and the current date
is also the age of the consumer. The expected lifetime utility derived from a
consumption flow c, a psychological discount factor α and a utility function of
consumption u is equal to
E
∙Z T
0
α(t)u[c(t)] dt
¸
=
Z T
0
S(t)α(t)u[c(t)] dt,
where T is the life duration, T its maximum value and where S is the survival
function of the consumer. The consumption is expressed in real terms. The
wealth is invested in risk free assets, and the real interest rate is equal to r. If
w is the wealth of the consumer, the income splits into consumption and savings
from the equation
rw +m = c+ w
0
. (2)
A utility of bequest is added to the lifetime utility, and is expressed as
α(T )β(T )ϕ(w(T )). The function ϕ denotes a utility depending on the amount
bequeathed which also integrates possible taxes. We suppose that u and ϕ are
increasing and concave. The utility also depends on the date of death through the
function β.We expect β to be hump-shaped, because the importance of bequests
is foremost when the consumer dies in his middle years. Then the aggregated
expected utility is equal to
E
∙Z T
0
α(t)u[c(t)] dt+ α(T )β(T )ϕ(w(T ))
¸
=
Z T
0
S αu(c) + παβϕ(w). (3)
We dropped the time index in the last integral. We denoted the density of the date
of death as π, with π = −S0. The optimal consumption plan during the whole
life maximizes the expected lifetime utility given in (3). The main assumption
if that the functions α, β, r,m and S are deterministic. Hence there is risk, but
no uncertainty on the life duration. The control variable is the consumption flow
and positivity constraints are retained on c and w. The initial wealth is assumed
positive, and a positive wealth during the whole life implies that
w = 0⇒
³
w
0 ≥ 0⇔ c ≤ m
´
. (4)
1
The last equivalence results from (2). Let us denote the instantaneous mortality
rate and the psychological discount rate as h = −S0/S; a = −α0/α. If the
positivity constraints on wealth and consumption are not binding, the optimal
consumption flow follows the Euler equations
c0
c
= ηu(c)
∙
(r − a) +
µ
h
∙
β ϕ0(w)
u0(c)
− 1
¸¶¸
, ηu(c) =
u0(c)
−c u00(c) . (5)
The coeﬃcient ηu(c) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the inverse
of the relative risk aversion. The diﬀerence r − a is usually negative, as the
subjective discount rate is most often greater than the real interest rate. The
consumption growth rate decreases with the mortality rate if u0(c) > βϕ0(w), i.e.
if the marginal utility of consumption exceeds the marginal utility of bequests.
The Euler equation constrains the shape of the optimal wealth path on the
life cycle. Leung (1994) proves that the optimal wealth is equal to zero at the end
of the life cycle in the absence of bequest motives, under fairly general conditions.
The sketch of the proof is the following: suppose that the functions r, a and ηu are
bounded, and that u0(0) = +∞. The last two conditions are fulfilled for CRRA
utility functions, and the last condition implies that the consumption is always
greater than zero at the optimum. In that case, the life cycle model is restricted
to the time interval where income is strictly positive, unless a positive initial
wealth can be considered. Since optimal consumption paths are continuous, we
obtain
min
0≤t≤T
c(t) = c > 0. (6)
Suppose that optimal wealth is greater than zero until the end of the life cycle,
in which case the Euler equation is fulfilled in the left neighborhood of T . If the
death rate h is increasing, we have that
S(T ) = exp
"
−
Z T
0
h(t) dt
#
= 0⇒ lim
t−→(T)
−
h(t) = +∞. (7)
If there is no bequest motive (ϕ ≡ 0), the Euler equation and equation (7) yield
the inequality
c0
c
= ηu(c) [(r − a− h)] ≤ η [(r − a− h)]
in the left neighborhood of T . We denote upper bounds with overlines and lower
bounds with underlines. If t1, t2 (t1 < t2) are in this neighborhood, we obtain
log c(t2)− log c(t1) ≤ η
∙µ
(r − a)(t2 − t1)−
Z t2
t1
h(t)dt
¶¸
2
⇒ c(t2)
c(t1)
≤ exp
£
η(r − a)(t2 − t1)
¤ ∙S(t2)
S(t1)
¸η
.
As S(T ) = 0, we obtain lim
t−→(T)
−
c(t) = 0 if the Euler equation is fulfilled in the
left neighborhood of T . As it is impossible from (6), the Euler equation is not
fulfilled at the end of the life cycle, which means that optimal wealth is then equal
to zero.
Leung’s argument can be extended in the presence of bequest motives with
some supplementary assumptions. Since we have
β ϕ0(w)
u0(c)
≤ β ϕ
0
(0)
u0(c)
from the concavity of ϕ, the inequality
c0
c
≤ ηu(c) [(r − a) + (h (x− 1))] , x ∈]0, 1[
holds if c ≤ cx, with u
0
(cx) = β ϕ
0
(0)/x. If cx is large enough so that optimal
consumption paths are below this value, Leung’s argument is still valid.
A.2 The Yaari’s model with LTC insurance
Yaari’s paper includes immediate annuities in the preceding model. The main
result is that, if immediate annuities are sold at the actuarial price,19 the optimal
consumption plan is the same as what would be obtained without risk on the life
duration (i.e. with a fixed horizon as in the Merton-Samuelson model).
In our model, we define three health states for the consumer: good health
(good enough not to necessitate LTC), LTC and death. They are respectively
numbered 1,2 and 3. Transitions exist only from state 1 to states 2 and 3 and
from state 2 to state 3. Hence the consumer cannot recover good health once he
has reached the LTC state.
Let us include LTC insurance in the model. We suppose that the coverage
can be bought only once in a lifetime. The purchase can occur only in state 1,
and the premium q is paid continuously until state 1 is left. If the policyholder
dies at this date, there is nothing left in the bequest from the insurance company.
If the policyholder enters the LTC state, an annuity Q is paid continuously by
19This means that the rate of return of the immediate annuities is equal to the interest rate
- (which assumes that the insurer’s assets pledged for these liabilities are risk free), plus the
mortality rate. Another important assumption in Yaari’s model is that annuities can be sold
by the consumer at the purchase price.
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the insurance company. Besides, the cost of LTC for the consumer (free of public
benefits) is equal to cltc.We suppose that Q ≤ cltc < m, in order to rule out both
overinsurance and insolvency. The premium q depends on the date of purchase
for obvious actuarial equity reasons.
In our model, the control variables are the consumption flow c and the
date of purchase x. A non purchase of LTC insurance can be associated with
x = T . The income equation depends on the state of health and on the purchase
indicator. In state 1, we have m+rw−q(x, •)1[x,T ] = c+w0. In state 2 with LTC
coverage, the income equation is m+ rw +Q− cltc = c+w0. If the consumer is
uninsured in the LTC state, the equation becomes m+ rw − cltc = c+ w0.
It is easily seen that the Euler equation on consumption is the same as that
given in (5) without LTC risk and the related insurance if the utility function
in the LTC state is the same that in good health. Let us denote pi(x) as the
probability of being in health state i at the date x, and pi,j(x, t) as the probability
of state i at the date x and of state j at the date t. All these probabilities are
derived at the birth of the consumer. For instance, the link between the annuity
and the premium if the date of insurance purchase is equal to x is given byZ T
x
p1 q(x, •)B(x, •) = (1 + τ)
Z T
x+D
p1,2(x+D, •)QB(x, •),
where a) τ is the loading factor derived from the real interest rate; b) D is the
duration of the qualifying period; c) B(x, t) = exp
h
−
R t
x r(u)du
i
is the discount
factor.
We have that
t ≤ x⇒ p1,2(x, t) = 0; p2,2(x, t) = p2(t).
t > x⇒ p1,2(x, t) + p2,2(x, t) = p2(t).
If the date of insurance purchase is equal to x, the expected lifetime utility is
equal toZ T
0
p1 αu(m+ rw−w
0 − q(x, •)1[x,T ])+
Z T
0
p1,2(x, •)αu(m+ rw+Q−w0 − cltc)
+
Z T
0
p2,2(x, •)αu(m+ rw − w0 − cltc) +
Z T
0
παβ ϕ(w) =
Z T
0
F (•, w, w0).
For sake of simplicity, we suppose here that there is no qualifying period. The
Euler equation on the wealth w :
∂
∂w
F (•, w,w0) =
∙
∂
∂w0
F (•, w, w0)
¸0
4
is expressed as follows
αβπϕ
0
(w) + αru
0
(c) (p1 + p1,2(x, •) + p2,2(x, •))
= −
h
αu
0
(c) (p1 + p1,2(x, •) + p2,2(x, •))
i0
.
From
p1 + p1,2(x, •) + p2,2(x, •) = p1 + p2 = S,
we obtain
αβπϕ
0
(w) + αrSu
0
(c) = −
h
αSu
0
(c)
i0
,
and the Euler equation already given in (5). However the income equations given
in this section are diﬀerent from that given in the basic Yaari’s model, and the
link between consumption and savings is also diﬀerent.
The optimal consumption flow and the date of purchase were obtained by
numerical integration, as the Euler equation is insuﬃcient by itself (it is not
fulfilled when optimal wealth is equal to zero) to derive the solution. The residual
lifetime utility is derived by backward induction, and the solutions are the control
variables which depend on the state variables (the wealth, the health state, the
purchase indicator and the date of purchase, the insurance indicator and the entry
date in LTC if the consumer is dependent).
We explicit the backward induction equations. Let us denote V iSV (t) the
residual lifetime utility at the date t (supposed to be an integer number of years
in what follows), where i is the health state (i = 1, 2, 3), and where SV are the
other state variables. They are listed below.
• If i = 3 (death between t−1 and t), we have SV = w, and V 3w(t) = β(t)ϕ(w).
• If i = 2 (LTC state at the date t), we have SV = w, j, te, with j the
indicator of LTC coverage and te the date of entry into LTC. Let us denote
p2→3(t | te) the death probability between t and t+ 1, given that the entry
into LTC was first observed at te (te ≤ t). This probability also depends on
gender and on calendar eﬀects, and is derived from the statistical analysis
of Section 3. The backward induction equation is
V 2w,j,te(t) = maxc≥0 u(c)
+
1
1 + at
£¡
(1− p2→3(t | te))× V 2w+,j,te(t+ 1)
¢
+
¡
p2→3(t | te)× V 3w+(t+ 1)
¢¤
,
with
w+ = (w + I)× (1 + rt); I = mt +Qt1[j=1] − cltct − c.
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• If i = 1 (good health at the date t), we have SV = w, j, x with j the
indicator of insurance purchase and x the purchase date if j = 1. Let us
denote p1→2(t) (resp. p1→3(t)) the transition probabilities between good
health and LTC (resp. between good health and death) during [t, t+1]. If
j = 1, the backward induction equation is
V 1w,1,x(t) = maxc≥0 u(c) +
1
1 + at
£¡
(1− p1→2(t)− p1→3(t))× V 1w+,1,x(t+ 1)
¢¤
+
1
1 + at
£¡
p1→2(t)× V 2w+,j,t+1(t+ 1)
¢
+
¡
p1→3(t)× V 3w+(t+ 1)
¢¤
where the coverage indicator j is obtained from the duration D of the
qualifying period by
j = 1⇔ te = t+ 1 > x+D⇔ t ≥ x+D; else j = 0.
w+ = (w + I)× (1 + rt); I = mt − qx,t − c.
If LTC insurance is not yet purchased, the purchase indicator becomes a
control variable, and we have
V 1w,0(t) = max(f1 , f2),
with
insurance not purchased: f1 = max
c≥0
u(c)
+
1
1 + at
£¡
(1− p1→2(t)− p1→3(t))× V 1w+,0(t+ 1)
¢¤
+
1
1 + at
£¡
p1→2(t)× V 2w+,0,t+1(t+ 1)
¢
+
¡
p1→3(t)× V 3w+(t+ 1)
¢¤
.
w+ = (w + I)× (1 + rt); I = mt − c.
insurance purchased: f2 = max
c≥0
u(c)
+
1
1 + at
£¡
(1− p1→2(t)− p1→3(t))× V 1w+,1,t(t+ 1)
¢¤
+
1
1 + at
£¡
p1→2(t)× V 2w+,0,t+1(t+ 1)
¢
+
¡
p1→3(t)× V 3w+(t+ 1)
¢¤
.
w+ = (w + I)× (1 + rt); I = mt − qt,t − c.
The consumer is not covered by LTC insurance if he buys the insurance
the year before entering in the LTC state if the qualifying period is greater
than zero, hence the notation V 2w+,0,t+1.
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